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A company’s valuation is based on theoretical models and analysts’ assumptions that 
intend to predict future events in the most reliable way. The present work project aims to 
estimate the fair value of Under Armour’s stock at December 31st, 2020. 
To perform this valuation, the Discounted Cash-Flow (DCF) was the primarily method 
used accompanied by a Multiples valuation.  
The DCF valuation output is that Under Armour is undervalued by the market, having a 
target price of $24.09 comparing to the price of $21.85 as of 06/01/2019. Hence, the 
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 We initiate the coverage of Under Armour with a BUY 
recommendation given our YE20 target price of $24.09, an upside 
of 10.3% relatively to the current price of $21.85. 
 Under Armour has been witnessing a slowdown over the 
past few years due to a struggling retail sector in the United States 
allied to an inefficient inventory management.  
 The sportswear industry is expected to grow at a 6.9% 
CAGR for 2019-2024, mainly driven by the athleisure trend and by 
an increasing health-consciousness that is spreading worldwide.  
 We forecast a 2019-2024 6.1% CAGR for UA’s net 
revenues as the company will now capitalise on blending its values 
through innovation and technology, by aiming to an increasing 
focused performer connectivity and international expansion.  
 Valuation: we computed a DCF valuation, forecasting net 
revenues by distribution channels and geographical segments, 
assuming a 4.9% WACC and a 3.8% terminal growth rate. 
Company description 
Under Armour, Inc. is an American sportswear company that 
develops, markets and distributes sports related performance 
products. The company operates in North America, EMEA, Asia-
Pacific and Latin America. The Connected Fitness business offers 
both digital fitness subscriptions and digital advertising through its 
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Moving from defense to offense 
Under Armour is back on track 
Recommendation: BUY 
Vs Previous Recommendation  
Price Target FY20: 24.09 $ 
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Price (as of 6-Jan-20) 21.85 $ 
Bloomberg: UAA US 
  
52-week range ($) 27.72-16.74 
Market Cap ($m) 9,231.7 
Outstanding Shares (m) 451.53 
  















(Values in $ millions) 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 5,193 5,297 5,683 
Gross Profit 2,340 2,467 2,712 
Net Profit (46) 110 161 
Dividends - - - 
EPS (0.10) 0.25 0.35 
P/E (X) 0 89 68 
ROIC (%) 4.54 5.89 8.40 
WACC (%) 4.90 4.90 4.90 
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Under Armour, Inc. is a performance enhancing company that sells sports related 
products. UA had its IPO in 2005 and it is currently listed at the NYSE. The 
sportswear company has two classes of common stock: Class A, UAA, and Class 
C, UA, both integrated in S&P 500. 
The company aims to be the number one in the competitive sportswear market, 
which is expected to grow at a 6.9% CAGR from 2019-2024. Under Armour’s net 
revenues come mostly from North America, followed by EMEA, Asia-Pacific and 
Latin America. Regarding the product, apparel continues to be the core business 
line, followed by footwear and accessories. Under Armour’s revenues are 
generated through wholesale, direct to consumer and licensing channels. 
Connected Fitness is seen as a growth driver for Under Armour, as the company 
is increasing its investment in this digital business line. 
Under Armour’s growth has been decreasing especially since 2017, as the 
company’s domestic market started to suffer in the retail sector. UA’s business 
still relies heavily on North America, that generated 72% of the company’s net 
revenues in 2018. The inefficient inventory management also slowed down 
Under Armour’s growth, leading to operating losses in both 2017 and 2018.  
The company recently faced a three-year restructuring process (2017-2019) to 
revert its situation, that ended with Kevin Plank, Under Armour’s founder, recently 
stepping down as CEO remaining Chairman and Chief Brand Officer.  
As the company’s rivals are betting on the athleisure trend, Under Armour 
focuses on a performance consumer that is a $92 billion addressable market. We 
see this focused performer and the international expansion mostly in the direct to 
consumer channel to be UA’s main drivers for the future. 
Under Armour faced a federal investigation in November 2019 over its 
accounting practices. The company “firmly believes that its accounting practices 
and disclosures were appropriate”. 
We forecast a 6.1% 5-year CAGR for Under Armour for the period of 2019-2024. 
Under Armour’s net revenues will mainly come from the international business 
and from the increases in the focused performer spending, globally.  
Our UA’s DCF valuation results on a BUY recommendation, with a price target of 
$24.09 for Class A share. We believe that the company is going to be capable of 
getting back on track, achieving sustainable growth in the medium and long term. 
UA intends to focus on 
performance consumers. 
 
Nike and Adidas are the two 
main players of the 
Sportswear sector. 
 
We believe UA’s restructuring 
process (2017-2019) is crucial 
for the company to adopt an 
offensive strategy. 
 
Contrarily to its rivals, Under 
Armour is not following the 
athleisure trend. 
 
The struggling U.S. retail 
sector and an inefficient 
inventory management led to 
UA’s operating losses. 
 
We forecast a $24.09 target 
price for December 2020, a 
BUY recommendation. 
 
Under Armour faced a federal 
investigation in November 
2019. 
 
        
 









Under Armour, Inc. (UA) is a developer, marketer and distributor of sports related 
performance products. The company sells a broad offering of apparel, footwear 
and accessories through the wholesale, direct to consumer (DTC) and licensing 
channels. UA had its IPO in 2005 and it is currently listed at the NYSE. The 
company has three classes of common stock: Class A (UAA US Equity) Class B 
and Class C (UA US Equity). Both Class A and C are integrated in S&P 500. 
Under Armour is currently based in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S. 
Company description 
Under Armour, Inc. is an American sportswear company that was founded in 
Washington, DC, on September 25, 1996, by its current Chairman and former 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Kevin A. Plank. The company soon moved to 
Kevin Plank’s hometown in Baltimore, Maryland, where the founder grew up and 
became a fullback and specials teams capitain at the University of Maryland’s 
football team. Driven by better performance, Kevin Plank came up with a 
lightweight and sweat-wicking shirt that used a synthetic base layer in order to 
keep its teammates dry and cool on footbal games. Under Armour then started to 
focus on athletes apparel by creating products with a special fabric that increased 
performance regardless the climate conditions - products that would keep them 
cool when it was hot (HotGear® fabric) and that would keep them warm when it 
was cold (ColdGear® fabric). Later, the company introduced a mixed fabric that 
would keep athletes comfortable between extreme conditions (AllSeasonGear®). 
Under Armour operates globally into four distinct geographical areas (exhibit 1): 
North America, Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA), Asia-Pacific and Latin 
America. The company sells a broad offering of apparel, footwear and 
accessories (exhibit 2) through its wholesale, direct to consumer and licensing 







“The shirt that started it all. It 
was soft. It was skin-tight. It 
was stretchy. And, most 
importantly, it wicked sweat 
faster than anything else out 
there, keeping athletes cool, 
dry and light.” 
Under Armour’s website 
UA is a branded performance 
products company that offers 
apparel, footwear & 
accessories and has 
headquarters in Baltimore, 
U.S. 
 
Exhibit 1: Net revenues by 
geography in 2018 (in % of 
total) 
Source: Company data 
Source: Company data Source: Company data 
Exhibit 2: Net revenues by business 
line in 2018 (in % of total) 
Exhibit 3: Net revenues by 
channel in 2018 (in % of total) 
        
 









The company first penetrated into the digital market in 2013, when it acquired 
MapMyFitness. In 2015, Under Armour amplifyed its presence in the business by 
acquiring Endomondo and MyFitnessPal. This community called Connected 
Fitness became the world’s largest digital fitness brand in the world by 20171. 
Under Armour reached $5,193 million in net revenues in 2018, recording a year-
over-year (yoy) growth of 4%. In 2017 and 2018 the company registered a net 
loss of $48 and $46 million, respectively, mostly due to its domestic business and 
inefficient inventory management. UA recently faced a three-year restructuring 
process (2017-2019) in which it intended to move from defense to offense to 
become a global leader in the sportswear industry. 
On November 18, 2005, Under Armour went public with an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) price of $13. The company raised about $157 million and nearly doubled its 
IPO price to a $25 closing one, reaching a maximum price of $31 during that day. 
UAA remained relatively constant over the past few years when compared to 







On January 1, 2020, Under Armour’s founder Kevin Plank stepped down as the 
company’s CEO. Kevin Plank will become the company’s executive Chairman 
and Brand Executive, allowing him to work more directly with the brand’s product 
and marketing2. Under Armour’s President and former Chief Operating Officer 
Patrik Frisk has been named CEO.  
Under Armour always focused on innovative athletic performance products and 
experiences as it did not change its mission throughout the years: to make all 
athletes better through passion, design and relentless pursuit of innovation. The 
company became the 7th most valuable sports brand in the world in 2019, 
according to Forbes (exhibit 5). 
                                               
1 High, Peter. 2017. “Under Armour Is Now The Largest Digital Health And Fitness Company On Earth”. Forbes, 
September 18. https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2017/09/18/under-armour-is-now-the-largest-digital-health-and-
fitness-company-on-earth 
2 Source: Quartz at Work 
Under Armour’s stock rose 
3% on October 22, 2019, as 
the company announced that 
Kevin Plank would be 
stepping down as CEO. 
Exhibit 5: World's top 10 most 
valuable sports brands in 2019 (in $ 
billion) 
Source: Forbes 
Exhibit 4: Under Armour's share performance vs. S&P 500 
and MSCI Index 
Source: Bloomberg 
Under Armour’s Connected 
Fitness integrates all the 
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Exhibit 8: Under Armour's sourcing 
by country (in % of total) 
Source: Company data 
Exhibit 7: Inventory growth vs. Net 
Revenues growth (in %) 
Source: Company data 
 
Supply Chain 
Under Armour’s raw materials include petroleum based products and cotton. 
These are developed by third parties that are based in low labour cost countries, 
such as China, Vietnam and Jordan, which allows the company to substantially 
reduce its costs and consequently increase its margins. UA’s main suppliers are 
Asian manufacturing companies such as Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings and Pou 
Chen Corporation (exhibit 6).  
Under Armour’s fast growth over the past few years also had its drawbacks 
considering its supply chain efficiency. In 2017, according to Colin Browne, UA’s 
Chief Supply Chain Officer, the company had the highest number of stock 
keeping units (SKUs) ever observed, recording about 690,000 SKUs. Under 
Armour’s inventory levels consequently increased by 26% in 2017, a growth that 
was not followed by a proportional increase in net revenues, that rose only 3% in 
the same year. This rise of unsold inventory levels damaged the company’s 
gross margin in 2%, reducing from 47% in 2016 to 45% in 2017 (exhibit 7).  
Considering the challenges faced by Under Armour up to 2017, the company 
developed a restructuring plan, aiming mostly at the efficiency of its supply chain 
and focusing on a new strategy to reduce unsold inventory levels. To do so, UA 
reduced its SKUs by 40%, recording about 415,000 units in 20183, allowing UA to 
focus on the products that are more profitable. Consequently, the inventory levels 
decreased about 12% in 2018 (exhibit 7). Also, the number of different materials 
used to develop products alongside with UA’s number of vendors was reduced 
by 75% and 30%4, respectively, allowing Under Armour to order products from 
more specialized partners at a lower price per unit, increasing the company’s 
expected gross margin in 2019 to 46%. 
Regarding the distribution of the supply sources, we can state Vietnam, the 
Americas, China and Jordan as Under Armour’s main sources of supply (exhibit 
8). Vietnam accounts for 23% of UA’s total sourcing, a number that the company 
expects to increase to 25% in 2023, mostly due to the country’s continued fast 
growing trend in the manufacturing sector observed in the last few years5. In 
2013, 43% of what Under Armour acquired from its suppliers came from China. 
This dependency on the Chinese market has been reducing over the last few 
years, with China representing about 18% of sourcing in 2018 as the company
                                               
3 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
4 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
5 Shoulberg, Warren. 2019. “Vietnam Is Becoming The Big Winner In The China Trade Wars”. Forbes, October 16. 
https://forbes.com/sites/warrenshoulberg/2019/10/16/us-finally-succeeds-in-vietnam-as-more-companies-move-sourcing-
there 
UA develops its raw materials 
through third parties settled in 
low labour cost countries. 
The company created a 
restructuring plan to increase 
its margins. 
Source: Bloomberg 
Exhibit 6: Under Armour’s suppliers 
(in % of total) 
        
 








tries to minimize its exposure to China trade risk and limit the impact of the trade 
tensions between the U.S. and China in the company’s operating activity. Under 
Armour predicts this trend to continue, expecting the sourcing from China to be 
about 7% by 2023. The Americas region accounts for 20% of UA’s sourcing, a 
number that is expected by the company to be reduced to 17%. Regarding 
Jordan, we can state that it has become increasingly more relevant in UA’s 
sourcing since 2013, accounting for 17% in 2018, and the company expects it to 
reach 18% by 2023. We believe this positive trend comes as a result of the free 
trade agreements for the manufacturing sector that Jordan signed with both the 
EU and the U.S., from which Under Armour can benefit when ordering products 
to be delivered in those regions. Also note that Indonesia is expected by the 
company to increase its weight on UA’s sourcing from about 6% in 2018 to 15% 
in 2023. The diversification of Under Armour’s supply chain alongside with its 
efficient management allows the company to better manage its inventories and 
optimize its cost of goods sold. The supply chain is a major driver for the gross 
margin and for service optimization, fundamental for UA’s intentions to become a 
global leader.  
Stock classes and structure 
Under Armour has currently three different types of stock classes. Two of them 
are publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE): Class A with the 
ticker UAA (1 vote per share), and Class C under the ticker UA (no voting rights). 
The shares of Class B common stock are not publicly traded and are held by 
UA’s founder Kevin Plank and entitle 10 votes per share. As of January 31, 2019, 
there were 187 million Class A, 34 million Class B Convertible Common Stock 
and 227 million Class C shares outstanding.  
Under Armour does not intend to pay cash dividends in a foreseeable future6 
contrarily to its competitors: Nike pays quarterly dividends, whereas Adidas and 
Puma pay them on an annual basis. Also note that Under Armour has Kevin 
Plank (15%), Wellington Management Company (14%), the Vanguard Group 
(11%), Adage Capital Management (9%) and Blackrock Inc. (7%) as the major 
holders (exhibit 9). 
 
 
                                               
6 Source: Under Armour annual report 2018 
Under Armour has three 
different types of stock 
classes: Class A, Class B and 
Class C. 
Exhibit 9: Shareholder's structure (in 
% of total) 
Source: Bloomberg 
Under Armour’s sourcing is 
expected to decrease its 
dependence upon China and 
the Americas. 
UA’s diversified supply chain 
reduces the company’s 













As a worldwide brand, Under Armour is exposed to potential weakening of 
economic conditions that could reduce both demand and consumer spending on 
the company’s products. We believe that the consumer confidence, the 
Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) and the unemployment rate are the main 
economic indicators related with Under Armour’s future performance. 
 In exhibit 10, we can observe the consumer confidence of China, the United 
States and Europe. This indicator has been increasing in China since April 2016, 
indicating the Chinese consumers are becoming more confident on future 
economic conditions and willing to increase their consumption spending, a good 
indicator for Under Armour’s future growth. In the United States we see an 
incremental decrease in consumer confidence in the last quarter. However, it is 
still above 100, indicating the American consumer still has confidence above the 
long-term average. In Europe, similarly to the United States, the consumer 
confidence has been constant over time by the long-term average of 100, stating 
relatively stable economic conditions in a foreseeable future in the region. 
The Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) is a leading indicator regarding future 
economic trends. It indicates manufacturers’ production based on demand 
forecasts. During last year, the United States’ PMI has been decreasing, 
indicating a potential lower demand for the American market. However, it is 
important to highlight that it an economy is considered healthy whenever its PMI 
is above 42.97. Therefore, with a current PMI of 48.1 (exhibit 11), we believe the 
American economy will continue to grow in the near future, in line with the 
consumer confidence predictions stated above. 
The unemployment rate (exhibit 12) is a crucial indicator as it affects a 
consumer’s personal income and thus, its consumption. This indicator has been 
decreasing generally over the past few years. The IMF expects this trend to 
continue especially in the United States, predicting a healthy economy for the 
next few years. The Euro Area has unemployment rate above 8%, and it is not 
expected to decrease the 7% level over the next few years, meaning that its 
consumers will have incentives to save more when compared to other regions. 
The unemployment in China has been fairly constant over the past few years 
over the values of 4% indicating future economic stability for the country.
                                               
7 Institute for Supply Management. 2019. “November 2019 Manufacturing ISM.” Accessed December 3. 
https://instituteforsupplymanagement.org/about/MediaRoom/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=31160&SSO=1 
Exhibit 10: Consumer confidence 
Source: OECD 
Exhibit 11: United States PMI 
Source: Institute for Supply 
Management 
 
Exhibit 12: Unemployment rate 
Source: IMF 
 
        
 









Under Armour has been, in the past few years, one of the fastest emerging 
sportswear companies in the apparel and footwear industries. The company is 
facing some drawbacks mostly due to its domestic business and inventory 
management, and we see the following as the primary key topics in the future. 
The North America challenge 
 The North America geographical segment comprises two directly operated 
countries, namely the United States (92%) and Canada. The region grew at an 
8% 2014-2018 CAGR, generating 72% of Under Armour’s net revenues in 2018. 
Under Armour runs 185 stores and two websites in North America, and it is 
present in about 13,500 distribution points, being available in about 40% off all 
the places where consumers can buy athletic apparel and footwear.8 Despite 
having a high dependence upon its domestic business, Under Armour is slowing 
reverting this trend (exhibit 13). North America is decreasing its net revenues 
yoy, inclusively reporting an operating loss of $66 million in 2018 caused by 
struggling retail market in the region. UA’s most relevant geographical market 
represents a $98 billion athletic apparel and footwear market, of which $29 billion 
are allocated to Under Armour’s target consumer: the focused performer9. 
To improve the North American business is crucial to UA’s turnaround. The 
company intended to use its domestic business strength to fuel its global 
ambition. However, changes in consumer preferences (mostly driven by the 
athleisure trend) and internal intensified competition in the region impacted 
negatively Under Armour’s North American business, that consecutively reported 
lower revenue growth rates than the international business (exhibit 14). As we 
can observe in exhibit 1510, Nike is the market leader in North America, followed 
by Adidas and Under Armour. We believe that the focused performer is now a 
huge opportunity for Under Armour as the North American consumer is becoming 
more and more active with more gym memberships (exhibit 16) and more 
engaged to sports and to a healthy lifestyle. Of the $29 billion focused performer 
market, $7 billion are spent on footwear11, making this business line one of the 
biggest opportunities regarding the focused performer in North America. The 
footwear business accounted for 60% and 50% of both Nike’s and Adidas’ sales, 
while Under Armour generated 21% of its net revenues through this business 
                                               
8 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
9 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
10 Relative to Under Armour’s comparables 
11 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
Exhibit 13: North America net 
revenues (in % of total)  
Source: Company data 
 
Exhibit 14: Net revenues growth (in %) 
Source: Company data 
 
Exhibit 15: North America 
market share (in %) 
Source: Passport – Euromonitor 
 
        
 








line. The footwear business is also an opportunity for the company to balance 
seasonality as the company’s revenues tend to increase during the 2nd half (2H) 
of the year (exhibit 17), and UA launches its shoes typically in the beginning of 
the year. Also, with the recent nomination of Stephanie Pugliese as North 
America President, UA expects to regain market share to its competitors in the 
region. 
International expansion 
The international expansion is the best way for Under Armour to offset a sluggish 
North America segment. The brand is underrepresented outside its domestic 
business when compared to its competitors, as its brand awareness has a lot of 
room for improvement at the international level (exhibit 18). The international 
business includes Asia-Pacific, EMEA and Latin America. It generated 9% and 
26% of UA’s net revenues in 2014 and 2018, respectively. The segment grew at 
a 49% CAGR during 2014-2018, and we expect it to be one of the primary 
expansion growth opportunities for Under Armour’s net revenues.  
Under Armour intends to build a global brand. In 2018, to drive international 
expansion, the company appointed Jason Archer, Manuel Ovalle and Massimo 
Baratto as new managing directors for Asia-Pacific, Latin America and EMEA, 
respectively. Additionally, UA announced the expansion of its Hong Kong office 
to serve as its Asia-Pacific headquarters as well as new regional headquarters in 
Amsterdam. Under Armour clearly intends to balance its domestic with its 
international business. However, in opposition to its competitors, most of UA’s 
revenues are generated in its domestic business, as we can observe in exhibit 
1912. Adidas’ and Nike’s international business accounted for 69% and 54% of 
the companies’ net sales in the last fiscal year, whereas UA’s international 
segment accounted only for 26%. As Under Armour’s North American business 
started to collapse, the company started to aim at the international segment to 
stimulate growth as it has several growth opportunities that will be further 
explained in the sector overview. However, international expansion has also its 
costs and drawbacks. To operate in a large number of countries implies concerns 
when it comes to consumers’ cultural differences, that can influence their 
preferences. Thus, a company can incur on the risk of recording unexpected high 
amount of unsold inventory and consequently decrease the company’s margins. 
A firm may also face economic costs when it intends to internationalize, by 
getting its revenues, margins and results exposed to volatility recorded by a 
certain country’s or region’s exchange, interest and inflation rates.
                                               
12 Adidas’ domestic business is the European one 
Source: Companies data, Analysts’ 
estimates 
 
Source: Company data 
 
Exhibit 18: Brand awareness (in %) 
Exhibit 16: Memberships at health 
clubs in the U.S. (in million) 
Source: IHRSA 
 
Exhibit 19: Net revenues in 2018 (in % 
of total) 
Exhibit 17: Quarterly revenues (in $ 
million) 
Source: Company data 
 
        
 










While its competitors appear to follow the athleisure trend, Under Armour is 
focusing on performance enhancing sportswear. The brand created a strong 
worldwide reputation in this matter with the help of ambassadors such as 
Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson. UA drives this performance through innovation and 
premium experiences to stretch the boundaries of what is possible. Naturally, a 
performance company needs high-performance consumers. Being so, Under 
Armour recently started to focus on a consumer whose ideas align with the 
company’s purpose: the focused performer. The focused performer is an athlete 
who is hardwired to fight and sees every barrier as an opportunity to reach their 
goals and ultimately get better. This target consumer only cares about 
performance apparel when it can really make a difference, and style is a part of 
this. The focused performer is an absolute new type of consumer: it is younger, 
more diverse when it comes to gender - 50% male and 50% female - and 
ethnicity - +3% vs. overall consumer; it is more active, with running and training 
as daily top activities13; and, most importantly, tends to spend more money, as 
we can state in exhibit 20. It is also a $92 billion addressable market. The way to 
engage this type of consumer is fundamental to increase revenues. To keep the 
focused performer on top on all UA’s decisions and to understand each and 
every one of them by creating a personalized experience with the help of social 
media interaction is crucial to drive the company’s growth. 
Digital 
The digital’s business goal is to strengthen Under Armour’s relationship with the 
focused performer. The digital trend is one of the major opportunities not only for 
Under Armour but also for every sportswear firm in the industry since consumers 
are becoming more connected to technology and with all it has to offer. In the 
sportswear sector, Adidas is closing stores and stepping up investment in digital 
to increase its e-commerce sales14 and Nike intends to make digital an 
advantage by creating a personalized and unique experience of its own through 
its website and applications development15. This digital trend is being reflected 
worldwide. In the U.S e-commerce retail sales are becoming a considerable part 
of companies’ sales (exhibit 21). The digital trend is also booming in China
                                               
13 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
14 Source: Adidas annual report 2018 
15 Source: Nike annual report 2019 
The focused performer is a 
new type of consumer that is 
growth opportunity for UA. 
 
Exhibit 20: Average spending last 6 
months, as of December 2018 (in $) 
Source: Company data 
 
Source: FRED St. Louis 
 
Exhibit 21: E-commerce retail sales in 
the U.S (in % of total sales)  
        
 








especially due to the increase in household ownership broadband connection 
from 72% in 2017 to 82% in 201816.  
Under Armour’s fuel are the consumers, namely the focused performers. For its 
strategic growth plan, UA intends to organize itself by becoming consumer 
centric. In that sense, the digital business is crucial. UA is engaging with the 
focused performer through several channels. Firstly, the company’s website.  It is 
the digital flagship and the core of Under Armour’s e-commerce experience. 
Secondly, UA’s app is the ultimate shopping experience made for the focused 
performers. Those who have the app shop twice as often as those who do not, 
with a 20% higher average order value17. UA intends to take the consumers’ data 
from Connected Fitness in order to better understand them and provide them a 
unique experience. Connected Fitness (exhibit 22) recorded a 58% CAGR 
between 2014 and 2018, and we believe that this trend will continue in the future 
as the digital business evolves. In the Connected Fitness business line Under 
Armour offers digital fitness subscriptions as well as digital advertising through its 
MapMyFitness, MyFitnessPal and Endomondo apps. MapMyFitness (acquired in 
2013) offers the fitness community a way to record and store their fitness 
activities. MyFitnessPal provides a way to track its users’ nutritional information 
and it is the number one grossing health and fitness app in Apple store and 
number two in Google store18. The digital business is fundamental to the 
consumer engagement, that is increasingly becoming more social, with 
Instagram turning a powerful marketing tool for sports brands (exhibit 23).  
The company is connecting the digital business to the non-digital one, in order to 
increase its revenues. UA’s HOVR footwear technology is a perfect example of 
the digital trend that the company is following. This innovative footwear is digitally 
connected to MapMyRun19, gathering all the athlete’s information with the Under 
Armour’s footwear, creating a full consumer experience. Another example of 
Under Armour’s digital business is Armourbox, a box that provides athletes with 
the apparel and accessories chosen by Under Armour according to their 
subscribers’ preferences. With this product, the company intends to pick the 
gear, in order for the consumer to get better. This way, the athlete or 
performance consumer can focus only on perform, look, and ultimately feel 
better.
                                               
16 Euromonitor International. 2019. “Digital Landscape in China.” Retrieved from Passport database 
http://www.portal.euromonitor.com. 
17 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
18 SensorTower. 2019. “Top Grossing Health & Fitness Apps Worldwide for October 2019.” Accessed December 4. 
https://sensortower.com/blog/top-grossing-health-and-fitness-apps-october-2019 
19 Included in MapMyFitness 
The combination of physical 
and digital is a trend that will 
most probably continue in the 
future. 
 
Source: Company data 
 
Exhibit 23: World’s top 10 most 
popular brands on Instagram (in 
millions of followers) 
Source: ISPO 
 
Exhibit 22: Connected Fitness net 
revenues (in $ million and % of total) 
Through Armourbox, the 
consumers save time and 
effort of finding the type of 
gear that suits them. 
 
        
 








HOVR and Athletic Recovery 
are two examples of 
innovative and revolutionary 
products created by Under 
Armour. 
 
Under Armour competes in 
the sportswear sector, 




Under Armour’s history of successful innovations shaped the company towards 
what it is today. UA’s objective is not only to just create new products, but also to 
change the way people exercise and live, providing them  solutions “you never 
knew you needed and cannot imagine living without”20. To do so, we believe one 
of the most important drivers of innovation is a company’s culture. Under 
Armour’s innovative environment attracts creative people and incentivizes them 
to come up with new ideas that can make an impact and drive up the value of the 
company. These ideas are built upon a go-to-market approach developed under 
UA’s restructuring process, crucial to turn these ideas and innovations into value 
for the firm. Note that even under this restructuring process, Under Armour 
continues to follow an innovation path instead of a more conservative approach 
that would possibly present better short term results. 
Under Armour’s innovation can be easily observable in its products, of which we 
highlight UA HOVR and UA’s Athletic Recovery. HOVR, as previously stated, is 
the major innovative product Under Armour has from its footwear sector. While it 
is also focused on making the athlete comfortable, what makes this shoe 
innovative is that it is connected with MapMyRun, UA’s run tracking app. Using 
these shoes, the app will give the wearer tips on how to improve the performance 
and reduce the risk of injury using the data the shoes collected. The Athletic 
Recovery uses far infrared technology imbued in its apparel products. Under 
Armour created a set of clothing, such as shirts, leggings, underwear and jackets 
that can be used to improve the muscles recovery and strength. Initially thought 
to be used during sleep, these clothing can also be used during the day.  
The Sector 
Under Armour competes in the sportswear sector which includes the 
manufacturing and retailing of sporting goods, such as athletic apparel, footwear, 
accessories and equipment. This sector is characterized mainly for its high 
competition, fragmentation and for having many market niches.  
A product’s quality, design and price, alongside with the brand awareness and 
effectiveness of distribution channels drives competition within this sector. 
However, not all companies have the power to compete with the sector’s two
                                               
20 Kevin Plank, Under Armour 2018 Investor Day 
UA’s right and appropriate 
culture is fundamental for an 
innovative environment. 
 
        
 








China and India are the two 
key markets of the Sportswear 
sector in Asia-Pacific. 
 major players, Nike and Adidas21. These billion dollar companies have proved to 
be in the vanguard year over year, with innovative, stylish and revolutionary 
products that change the consumer preferences on a regular basis. The 
necessary large capital investment in both innovation and research and 
development (R&D) is one of the high entry barriers within the sportswear sector, 
and partially protects the incumbents from external competition. Also, marketing 
is seen as an important value driver and thus, companies like Nike and Adidas 
incur on significant high marketing costs (exhibit 24) when compared to their 
peers to increase their brand awareness relatively to their customers. The 
considerable number of firms in the sector leads to the consumers’ high 
bargaining power. This way, differentiation from its competitors is fundamental if 
a company intends to succeed in the sector. Similarly, the abundant number of 
potential suppliers lead to a company’s high bargaining power considering the 
supplied raw materials22. 
Globally, the sportswear sector grew at a 4.5% CAGR from 2014 to 2019, 
reaching a market size of $354 billion in the latter. This growth is expected to 
continue as it is predicted a 6.9% CAGR from 2019 to 2024, with a market size of 
$494 billion23. The sportswear industry includes both the sports apparel and 
footwear categories, that accounted for 60% and 40% of the total market in 2018, 
respectively. Geographically, the sector has a higher market share in North 
America, followed by EMEA, Asia-Pacific and Latin America (exhibit 25).  
North America is the largest region for sportswear, as it generated 38% of the 
industry’s global sales, with the United States alone accounting for 36%. This is 
the region in which most fashion trends begin and then spread worldwide, as the 
athleisure trend. Although the region has been suffering from lower retail 
demand, it has the highest per capita spending in the category24. The increasing 
concern for health (exhibit 16) is driving the region’s demand for sportswear, 
expected by Euromonitor to grow at a 6% CAGR from 2018 to 2023.  
The sportswear industry in Asia-Pacific is expecting strong growth in the 
upcoming years according to Euromonitor, with an estimated 9% CAGR from 
2018 to 2023. China and India are the two key markets at the forefront of future 
growth opportunities in the region due to powerful emerging connection to sports 
                                               
21 Essays, UK. (November 2018). Competition in the sportswear industry. Retrieved from 
https://www.ukessays.com/essays/marketing/competition-in-the-sportswear-industry-marketing-essay.php?vref=1 
22 Essays, UK. (November 2018). Competition in the sportswear industry. Retrieved from 
https://www.ukessays.com/essays/marketing/competition-in-the-sportswear-industry-marketing-essay.php?vref=1 
23 Euromonitor International. 2019.  Retrieved from Passport database http://www.portal.euromonitor.com. 
24 Euromonitor International. 2019. “World Market for Apparel and Footwear.” Retrieved from Passport database 
http://www.portal.euromonitor.com. 
Source: Companies data 
 
Exhibit 24: Marketing costs in 2018 
(in $ million) 
Source: Passport - Euromonitor 
 
Exhibit 25: Sportswear by region (in %) 
        
 








and explosive middle class growth25. China has a vast growth potential as its 
government is implementing policies to promote sports participation such as the 
increasing number of non-profit public fitness activities26. Also, the country’s 
middle class has been one of the fastest growing in the world, swelling from 2% 
in 1992 to 39% in 2019 of the country’s population (exhibit 26). The country’s 
sales of sportswear have also been increasing on an annual basis (exhibit 27) 
India is set to become the third largest apparel and footwear market in the next 
five years, due to the country’s young demographic profile that drives and 
increases sportswear demand. Under Armour intends to penetrate in the Indian 
market as it recently opened its first brand store in the region, intending to open 9 
more in the region, crucial for the company’s international growth ambitions.  
EMEA is characterized by its heterogeneity since the region is constituted by 
several countries, such as France, the UK and Germany, each one representing 
a market with its own different characteristics. The sportswear market in Europe 
is characterized by a fierce price competition mainly in the athleisure market, 
which offsets the positive effect of growing demand caused by increasing health 
awareness. Being so, we believe Under Armour’s focus in performance over the 
athleisure trend can be vital for the firm’s growth in the region, as it will allow the 
company to differentiate from its competitors and step away from this price war. 
The region is expected by Euromonitor to grow at a 3% CAGR from 2018 to 
2023.  
In the last the last few years, the sportswear sector has been evolving in an 
unstable way in Latin America. This is primarily due to economic crisis that 
decreased the region’s GDP, affecting negatively the revenues of sportswear 
brands in Latin America. Moving forward, IMF forecasts for the GDP foresee 
more stable growth for the future, so we believe this will become an attractive 
market for sportswear companies to grow. According to Euromonitor, Mexico will 
be the main driver of sportswear growth in Latin America, becoming the largest 
market in the region by 2020. The region is expected by Euromonitor to grow at a 
4% CAGR from 2018 to 2023.  
This continuous worldwide growth is being supported mainly by the athleisure 
and women’s trend, as well as by an increasing engagement with fitness and 
health consciousness worldwide.  
The Athleisure trend refers to a fashion trend characterized by wearing athletic 
apparel or footwear that is both comfortable and aesthetically appealing in daily 
                                               
25 Garret, Olivier. 2018. “The 3 Biggest Trends That Will Drive Gold In The Next 30 Years”. Forbes, June 20. 
https://forbes.com/sites/oliviergarret/2018/06/20/the-3-biggest-trends-that-will-drive-gold-in-the-next-30-years/ 
26 Dreyer, Mark. 2018. “The future direction of China’s sports policy”. China Sports Insider, March 12. 
http://chinasportsinsider.com/2018/03/12/future-direction-chinas-sports-policy/ 
Exhibit 26: China's economic classes 
(in %) 
Source: Pew Research Center 
 
Athleisure is one of the main 
trends in the industry. 
However, UA does not intend 
to follow this movement. 
 
Exhibit 27: Sportswear sales in China 
(in billion yuan) 
Source: ChinaPower 
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Nielsen, 2016 
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activities. The relaxation of dress codes over the past decade has played a huge 
role in the rise of athleisure. It has become socially acceptable to wear casual 
and even sportswear clothing to formal occasions or events. The global 
athleisure market size was valued at $300 billion in 2018 by Grand View 
Research and expected to reach $350 billion by 2020 by A.T. Kearney. As it is 
observable in exhibit 28, Nike and Adidas detain a considerable share of the 
North American Athleisure market with 42% and 28%, respectively. Under 
Armour only represents 6% since it does not intend to be a part of this 
movement, as its focus relies only on developing performance products. Note 
that Lululemon took a major role fuelling the athleisure movement.  
Sports is one of the most important means to promote gender equality and to 
empower women. Under Armour endorses female athletes such as the ballet 
dancer Misty Copeland, the soccer player Kelley O’Hara and the ski racer 
Lindsey Vonn. Due to cultural evolution, gender equality the trend is reverting, 
and more women have been practicing sports. Women are becoming more 
interested in sports (exhibits 29 and 30), making them a new target consumer for 
companies. Such reduction in the gender disparity in sports led to an increase in 
the number of potential clients for the sportswear industry. This increase has 
been very well exploited by Lululemon, that was a pioneer in the athleisure trend 





Nike and Adidas are undoubtedly the major players within the sportswear 
industry, recording much higher net revenues comparing to its competitors.
Exhibit 30: Women interest in 
sports (over 50 years) 
Exhibit 29: Women interest in 
sports (under 50 years) 
Exhibit 28: Athleisure North America 
market share 
Sources: Passport – Euromonitor, 
Companies data 
 
Women are no longer 
accepting the “pink it and 
shrink it” strategy. They want 
choices and options thought 
for them. 
        
 









Michael Jordan Nike 60.0$       
Lebron James Nike 30.0$       
Kevin Durant Nike 28.5$       
Cristiano Ronaldo Nike 21.7$       
Lionel Messi Adidas 20.0$       
Tiger Woods Nike 20.0$       
The two sportswear giants endorse celebrities such as Michael Jordan, Tiger 
Woods and Cristiano Ronaldo in Nike’s case, and Lionel Messi, James Harden 
and Justin Rose in Adidas’ case.  
Nike (NKE US Equity) is the market leader in the sportswear industry as it 
continuously records considerable higher revenues than competitors (exhibit 31). 
The American company endorses some of the world’s most valuable athletes 
(exhibit 32) as it sells under the NIKE, Jordan, Hurley and Converse brands, 
giving it a wide scope for brand positioning. Despite the slowing revenue growth, 
Nike considers itself a growth company as it intends to transform its strategy 
towards innovation. through large investments in R&D. The company is also 
investing in the digital market to improve consumer experience by focusing on its 
website and Nike+ apps, as well as in the Chinese market, in which Nike defined 
Beijing and Shanghai as two of twelve global cities to focus on.  
Adidas sells sports apparel in more than 160 countries. The German sportswear 
company is Nike’s biggest rival as it is one of the top sporting goods 
manufacturers worldwide. It sells under the adidas and Reebok brands, limiting 
the company’s scope for brand positioning when compared to Nike. Footwear is 
Adidas’ biggest and fastest-growing product category, accounting for 60% of 
sales. The company intends to bet on the digital trend, having inclusively reduced 
the number of physical stores over the last few years, and it also intends to 
expand its international business in North America. Adidas spends half of its 
marketing budget on sponsorship deals, focusing mostly on soccer players and 
teams such as Leonel Messi, Bayern Munich and Manchester United. 
Even though they are growing, Puma’s revenues are far from its two biggest 
competitors’ as the German company was not able to be as innovative as the 
aforementioned. The firm focus on shoes, while apparel accounts for a growing 
small portion of sales. Puma also tries to associate itself with word tier sportsmen 
and teams, having this year signed a sponsorship with Manchester City. 
 Multiples valuation 
Even though the DCF is one of the most widely used valuation model due to its 
accuracy, we performed a multiples valuation to complement the former. 
For this analysis, Nike, Adidas and Puma were the competitors chosen since 
these are the ones that have the same segments of revenues that come from the 
selling of the same type of products, and also that have an equivalent business 
model towards a similar consumer, driven by innovation. We used the Enterprise 
Value to EBITDA ratio as we believe it is the most relevant multiple. We reached 
Adidas, Nike and Puma were 
the UA’s competitors chosen. 
 
Exhibit 32: World's biggest 
endorsement deals (in $ million) 
Source: Total Sportek 
 
Exhibit 31: Net revenues (in $ million) 
EV/EBITDA valuation states 
that Under Armour is currently 
overvalued by the market. 
 

















an Under Armour’s share price of $19.98 for Class A, a SELL recommendation, 
as the company has a higher multiple when compared to its peers (exhibit 33). 
Valuation 
Our valuation of Under Armour is made using the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
method. This method discounts the free cash flow of the firm at the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC), in order to estimate the value of the company’s 
stock by December 31, 2020. To do so, we analysed past data from 2014 to 
2018 and forecasted results from 2019 to 2024. The terminal value is computed 
to project the value generated after 2024. 
Forecasts 
 Revenues 
First of all, it is fundamental to estimate revenues with the maximum precision to 
the company’s valuation since several other captions on the financial statements 
depend upon them, being of major importance to our forecasts and valuation. 
The sportswear sector trends are very difficult to estimate as the consumers’ 
preferences are constantly changing. Hence, we believe a company’s ability to 
foresee and follow those trends will determine its growth in the future. 
We started to breakdown Under Armour’s net revenues by distribution channels, 
moving deeper to geographical segments within each channel. Note that, as 
previously stated, Under Armour operates in North America, EMEA, Asia-Pacific 
and Latin America, using the wholesale, DTC and licensing channels. 
Under Armour intends to continue to be a premium and performance brand, and 
it is strongly investing on its own performance niche instead of following the 
athleisure trend. The company’s increasing focus on the consumer is now 
strongly embedded in its culture and daily operations27. As previously stated, the 
focused performer is a new type of consumer that is determined to win in athletic 
performance, and we believe it is one of UA’s value drivers for the future. Being 
so, our estimations regarding the wholesale business within each region rely 
upon this focused performer. The wholesale channel accounted for 62% of Under 
Armour’s net revenues in 2018, a number that has been decreasing every year 
since 2014, when this type of distribution represented 67% of the company’s 
sales. We strongly believe in this decreasing tendency and importance of the 
wholesale in detriment of the direct to consumer channel (exhibit 35). Under
                                               
27 Under Armour’s mission is to Make You Better 
The method used to value UA 
was the Discounted Cash 
Flow method. 
Exhibit 34: Revenue drivers 
We assumed the focused 
performer as revenue driver 
for the wholesale channel.  
Exhibit 33: Multiple valuation 
Source: Bloomberg, Analysts 
estimates 
 
        
 








Armour is making efforts to mix these two types of distribution channels not only 
to increase margins but also to have more control over the selling price as well as 
over the message it intends to pass to its consumers, in order to increase brand 
awareness. For our forecasts, we focused on the yearly spending of a focused 
performer on Under Armour’s wholesale as well as on the increasing number of 
focused performers within each region. According to UA, the focused performer 
spends, on average, 16% more on athletic apparel and it is younger than the so 
called overall consumer. We see its consumption directly related to each region’s 
different consumption growth in apparel and footwear for the future, as the 
number of focused performers to increase at the forecasted growth rate of each 
region’s population between 15 and 39 years, according to the United Nations.  









The direct to consumer is increasing its relevance as it accounted for 31% and 
35% of Under Armour’s net revenues in 2014 and 2018, respectively. We divided 
this channel into DTC retail and DTC digital. Regarding the retail, we used the 
number of houses (exhibit 36) as driver for demand and revenues per house as a 
driver for price. The company owns both brand and factory houses globally. 
Factory house stores serve an important role in overall inventory management as 
the company sells a significant portion of excess through this channel, especially 
discontinued and out-of-season products. Through brand house stores, 
consumers can experience the full premium expression of the brand while having 
broader access to performance products. In 2018, UA had 179 houses in North 
America and 140 houses internationally. Our forecasts for the number of stores 
are derived from the company’s expectations about house openings per 
geography: UA intends to have 235 and 320 houses in North America and in the 
international business by 2023, respectively. We see the international business
Exhibit 35: Weights in net revenues (in % of total) 
Source: Company data, Analysts’ estimates 
 
We believe that the wholesale 
channel will decrease in % of 
net revenues.  
We assumed the number of 
brand and factory stores as 
driver for the DTC retail 
channel.  
        
 








growing at a higher pace in brand and factory stores than North America, with a 
particular emphasis for China that we see opening 20 house stores per year. We 
believe that the revenues per house will increase as the company opens more 
houses, growing at the average growth rate of the consumer spending of clothing 
and footwear over the last 10 years.   










The DTC digital revenues are generated by Under Armour’s e-commerce sites 
globally. The company has 2 websites in North America, 15 in EMEA, 14 in Asia-
Pacific and 3 in Latin America. We see the digital business as a key driver for 
UA’s growth. We expect the DTC digital to grow at the forecasted e-commerce 
sales growth in each region by eMarketer. We see Asia-Pacific as the fastest-
growing region in the digital business, as the e-commerce spending is expected 
to triple by 2025, in a study made by Facebook and Bain & Company. Also, we 
see Latin America’s growth mostly driven by the digital sector and the positive 
future prospects regarding consumers’ disposable household income (exhibit 37), 
expected to grow 22% by 203028, leading to an increase in middle class growth 
and final consumption expenditure. Overall, we forecast a 2019-2024 CAGR of 
10% for the digital channel. 
                                               
28 Source: Under Armour Investor Day 2018 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Exhibit 36: Brand and factory house stores per region 
Source: Company data, Analysts’ estimates 
 
Exhibit 37: Latin America household 
consumption expenditure (in % of 
GDP) 
Exhibit 38: DTC digital net revenues (in $ million) 
Source: Company data, Analysts’ estimates 
 
        
 













Licensing revenues have the particularity of being of extremely difficult to 
estimate because the conditions of the licensing contracts are not publicly 
available. As the past licensing revenues grew at the same % of net revenues, 
we believe it is driven by the same conditions that drive total revenues. Since it 
represents a small share of UA’s revenues, we assumed it to be constant based 
on the firm’s expectations. For North America, we considered the licensing 
revenues to continue the trend to be 2% of the region’s total net revenues. For 
EMEA, the company does not intend to have licensing revenues, whereas for 
Asia-Pacific29, Under Armour wants to reduce the 6% of the region’s net 
revenues to 2%. Finally, for Latin America, the company intends to start on 
having revenues that come from the licensing channel, thus we assumed it to be 
constant and equal to 1% of the region’s net revenues for the period 2019-2024.  
In the Connected Fitness business Under Armour offers digital fitness 
subscriptions as well as digital advertising through its apps. MapMyFitness 
(acquired in 2013) offers the fitness community a way to record and store their 
fitness activities. MyFitnessPal (acquired in 2015) provides a way to track its 
users’ nutritional information. Endomondo (acquired in 2015) works as personal 
fitness trainers to be used for several sports activities. With 250 million 
subscriptions in 201830, the Connected Fitness business line is, strategically, one 
of the most important for Under Armour, regardless the small share of revenues it 
has. It allows the firm to collect data from customers and use it in order to better 
understand their preferences, so the company can focus its R&D investment 
creating products attractive to consumers. This allows the firm to manage its 
inventories more efficiently by reducing the quantity of unsold products. In 
addition, it allows UA to create products that connect with its applications, 
creating synergies between its different business lines. Two examples are the UA 
HOVR running shoe and ArmourBox (mentioned in the Innovation sector). In 
conclusion, the Connected Fitness sector has positive synergies with all other 
sectors that should not be disregarded at all. For the Connected Fitness, our 
main assumption was that Under Armour will maintain its market share on the 
Fitness Apps market and, therefore, will grow at the same rate as the market. We 
took statista’s forecasts for the Fitness App revenues and assumed the same 
market share for this business line: 5.3%. We believe the Fitness App market has 
a huge growth potential due to the increasing awareness for the importance of an 
                                               
29 Licensing revenues are generated by Dome Corporation in Asia-Pacific 
30 Source: Under Armour investor day 2018 
Source: Bloomberg 
Exhibit 39: Fitness Apps acquisition 
price (in $ million) 
Licensing was forecasted 
based on the company’s 
intentions regarding each 
region’s licensing 
agreements.  
UA uses Connected Fitness to 
collect data from its 
customers and to create more 
attractive products based on 
their preferences.  
        
 








active and healthy lifestyle. We forecast a 6% 2019-2024 CAGR for the 









 Gross Margin 
Under Armour’s supply chain transformation over the past three years of 
restructuring can create sustainable opportunities for the company to expand its 
gross margin, a critical part of its business. Under Armour’s gross margin has 
been decreasing on a yearly basis since 2014 to 2018, with values of 49.03% 
and 45.07%, respectively. As previously explained, an efficient inventory 
management is crucial for the gross margin. The number of inventory that the 
company needs to sell off-price or promoted is reducing as net revenues 
continues to increase. Also, we believe that Under Amour’s expansion in the DTC 
channel will allow the company to increase its gross margin by getting a higher 
control over the selling price. We see the inventory levels to grow at 50% of 
Under Armour’s net revenues growth and the inventory turnover increase, 
reaching a value of 3.12 (maximum of the last 5 years) by 2024 as UA has one of 
the smallest turnovers when comparing to its competitors. Thus, we see Under 









Exhibit 42: Inventory turnover vs. Gross margin (in %) 
Source: Company data, Analysts estimates 
 
Exhibit 40: Connected Fitness net revenues (in $ million) 
Source: Company data, Analysts estimates 
 
        
 








 Operating margin 
Under Armour’s operating margin, similarly to the gross margin, has been 
decreasing yoy since 2014 to 2018, with a particular emphasis for 2018 when it 
reached 48 negative basis points due to an operating loss of $25 million.  
The company’s selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) have been 
increasing in percentage of net revenues in the past few years, from 38% in 2014 
to 42% in 2018. Under Armour divides SG&A into marketing and other costs. As 
it is Under Armour’s intention to become one of the market leaders, we believe it 
is crucial for the firm to invest in marketing to increase its brand awareness. 
Therefore, we forecast UA’s marketing expenses to converge to the average of 
its two main competitors, Nike and Adidas, to 11.4% of revenues. This forecast is 
in line with UA’s target to have marketing expenses between 10% and 12% of 
revenues and reinvest in marketing some of the costs saved from the 
restructuring plan.31 Other costs in SG&A include the expenses related to DTC 
expansion and internationalization, for which we assumed last year’s value of 
32%. Being so, we expect SG&A to grow at a 6% 5-year CAGR from 2019 to 
2024. The operating margin is expected to increase on a yearly basis and reach 
5% in 2023. Hence, we believe Under Armour’s expectations of having a low 
double-digit operating margin by 2023 are too optimistic. 
 Debt to Equity ratio 
Under Armour’s debt englobes short term, long term debt as well as operating 
lease liabilities, that recently started to be reported on the firm’s Balance Sheet.  
The company has been reducing its debt (excluding lease liabilities) during its 
restructuring process, reporting a D/E ratio of 40% and 36% in 2016 and 2018, 
respectively. This reduction in debt coincided with S&P’s rating downgrade to BB 
in the beginning of 2017,32 as companies after a downgrade, especially below 
investment rating, tend to reduce leverage.33On the other hand, it is Under 
Armour’s intention to grow to the same level as its main competitors. Even 
though the company has been reducing its debt since 2017, we believe that, 
ended its restructuring period, and with improvements on results, the company’s 
D/E ratio will converge to its competitors’ average of 66%, as the company will 
need to increase its leverage to find investment growth opportunities.
                                               
31 Source: Under Armour 2018 Investor Day. 
32 Townsend, Matthew and Boston, Claire. 2017. “Under Armour Credit Rating Cut to Junk by S&P Amid Slowdown”, 
Bloomberg. February 1. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-01/under-armour-s-credit-rating-cut-to-junk-
by-s-p-amid-slowdown 
33 Darren J. Kisgen, 2009. “Do Firms Target Credit Ratings or Leverage Levels?” 
We believe UA’s marketing 
expenses will converge to its 
competitors’ (in % of 
revenues). 
Other costs include the 
expenses with DTC expansion 
and internationalization, 
crucial for UA’s future growth.  
As the company grows, we 
believe UA’s credit metrics 
will improve and allow its 
leverage to converge to its 
competitors’. 
        
 








Target Capital Structure 
Debt to Equity Ratio 66.3%
Debt to Value 39.9%
Equity to Value 60.1%
Cost of Equity
Risk-free rate 1.8%
Market risk Premium 5.7%
Levered Beta 0.90




Loss given Default 52.1%
Default probability 2.2%
Yield to Maturity 3.6%
Cost of Debt 2%
Taxes 21.0%
    After Tax Cost of Debt 1.9%
WACC 4.90%
WACC Calculation
24 4.5% 4.7% 4.9% 5.1% 5.3%
3.4% 24.36 20.66 17.95 15.88 14.26
3.6% 29.57 24.23 20.54 17.85 15.80
3.8% 37.80 29.40 24.09 20.43 17.75
4.0% 52.79 37.59 29.24 23.96 20.32









Cost of Capital 
In order to calculate the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), we considered 
as inputs the cost of equity, cost of debt and target Debt to Equity ratio.  
The cost of equity was calculated through the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the 
CAPM. This model has as inputs the risk-free rate, a market risk premium and a 
beta. For the risk-free rate we assumed the 10-year U.S. government bond yield 
of 1.79%. For the market risk premium we considered the United States risk 
premium recommended by Damodaran as of July 2019, of 5.67%. Lastly, our 
beta was estimated based on Under Armour’s comparables: Nike, Adidas and 
Puma. For each we regressed the company’s stock returns against the S&P 500 
Index to determine the levered betas. Then, using each company’s current Debt 
to Equity ratio, we were able to reach the unlevered betas. As previously stated, 
we believe that UA’s target Debt to Equity ratio will converge to its competitors’, 
thus, we assumed a D/E of 66.25%. Using this target, we computed the relevered 
beta reaching a value of 0.90. Finally, we reached a cost of equity of 6.9%. 
The cost of debt has as inputs the loss given default (LGD), the probability of 
default and the company’s yield to maturity. For the loss given default we 
assumed a value of 52.1%, since it is the one considered by Moody’s as the 
average between 1987 and 2017. The probability of default was also taken from 
Moody’s as the average cumulative default rates for the firms with Baa2 rating, 
as it is Under Armour. The company’s yield to maturity was taken from 
Bloomberg and equal to 3.59%.   
With all the inputs calculated, we got a weighted average cost of capital of 4.90% 
Sensitivity analysis  
We performed a sensitivity analysis to test two of our major valuation inputs: the 
WACC and the terminal growth rate. The WACC is crucial as it is the rate that 
discounts the company’s cash flows, and the terminal growth rate as it stands for 
a perpetual rate. We can see that the target price its very sensitive to both the 
discount rate and to the perpetual growth rate, changing our recommendations 
depending on the new price. Through this analysis, we reached a maximum 
target price of $88.62 and a minimum target price equal to $14.26.
Exhibit 44: Sensitivity analysis 
Source: Analysts estimates 
 
Exhibit 43: WACC calculation 
Source: Analysts estimates 
 
We performed a sensitivity 
analysis of UA’s target price 
regarding the WACC and the 
terminal growth rate. 
        
 









Scenario Analysis  
Under Armour’s revenues are subject to several factors that do not only depend 
on the company. To a better understanding on UA and its stock’s sensitivity to its 
drivers, we created different scenarios in addition to the base case.  
 Marketing & CapEx 
Marketing expenses and Capital Expenditures (CapEx) are crucial items when it 
comes to Under Armour’s valuation.  
Our forecasts for CapEx and marketing expenses were based on our revenues’ 
estimations. However, a sudden increase or decrease in those captions would 
impact the final price and our recommendation. We also have to keep in mind 
that UA’s managers defined as target for the CapEx to be between 3% and 5% of 
revenues, and marketing expenses to be between 10% and 12% of revenues.  
For these scenarios, we are assuming that only these two variables change, 
while everything else, including revenues, remains constant. This will happen if 
the expenses necessary for an investment, such as a new brand house or a 
sponsorship contract, are different than the expected. 
For the marketing costs, we believe a change in the expenses with sponsorship 
contracts could impact the necessary investment for UA to be associated with its 
ambassadors. Sponsorship contracts are an important part of marketing 
expenses of any sportswear firm, as these tend to benefit when associated with 
the best sport practitioners. The competition for those athletes could drive up the 
price of their contracts, increasing the marketing expenses. On the other hand, if 
the price of sponsorship contracts decreases, marketing expenses can be 
reduced as % of UA’s revenues. For our base case, as previously stated, we 
assumed constant marketing expenses equal to the competitors’ average of 
11.42% of net revenues. 
Due to the firm’s strategy of investing in DTC retail, we believe an important 
source of capital expenditures in the future might be in real estate. Therefore, 
changes in the real estate market will impact UA’s CapEx. According to the UBS 
Real Estate Bubble Index, several cities are nowadays overvalued, with the   
Changes in marketing 
expenses and CapEx would 
impact the company´s target 
price and our 
recommendation. 
Our base case assumes 
marketing as 11.42% of UA’s 
net revenues. 
        
 








Scenario High Expenses Low Expenses
Marketing 12% 10%
CapEx 5% 3%
Target Price 11.02$            54.58$           
Recommendation SELL BUY
Scenario Tax Rate 28% Tax Rate 35%
Tax Rate 28% 35%
Target Price 22.09$          20.08$          
Recommendation HOLD SELL
examples of Hong Kong (UA’s headquarters in Asia-Pacific), London and 
Amsterdam (UA’s headquarters in EMEA). If in the future the market corrects the 
real estate prices in these cities, the firm would acquire the same properties at a 
lower price, therefore decreasing CapEx. If the prices on those cities continue to 
increase, then we believe the CapEx would increase relatively to the revenues. 
For our base case, we assumed CapEx equal to 3.91% of net revenues, based 
on the last three years in which Under Armour faced a restructuring process. 
 In our high expenses scenario, we assumed an increase in both Marketing 
expenses and CapEx to 12% and 5% of revenues, respectively, reaching a target 
price of $11.02, changing our recommendation to SELL. In our low expenses 
scenario, we assumed a decrease in both marketing and CapEx to 10% and 3%, 
respectively. In this case, our target price would increase to $54.58, a BUY 
recommendation (exhibit 45). 
 U.S. Presidential elections 
We believe that an important source of risk is the outcome of the United States 
presidential elections in 2020 as this is Under Armour’s main region in which it 
operates. A simulation from Moody’s gives Donald Trump the probability of 60% 
of winning the next presidential elections.34. In case of a democratic victory, we 
believe the value of the new corporate tax rate will increase. Joe Bidden 
proposes to raise it to 28%, while Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders and Pete 
Buttigieg intend to re-raise it back to 35%. According to a pool of The New York 
Times, Joe Bidden is leading the voting intentions with 27%, followed by Bernie 
Sanders with 19%35. Since Trump took office in the beginning of 2016 and the 
new corporate tax rate was adopted in 2018, we assume it would also take two 
years for the new democratic president to increase the tax rate. So, the new tax 
rate would be adopted in 2023. Both scenarios would change our 
recommendation. In Tax Rate 28% scenario, our target price decreases to 
$22.09, changing our recommendation to HOLD. In Tax Rate 35%, our target 
price decreases further to $20.08, a SELL recommendation (exhibit 46). 
                                               
34 Cox, Jeff. 2019 “Trump is on his way to an easy win in 2020, according to Moody’s accurate election model”, CNBC, 
October 15. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/moodys-trump-on-his-way-to-an-easy-2020-win-if-economy-holds-up.html 
35 Lee, Jasmine; Daniel, Annie; Liebermen, Rebecca; Migliozzi, Blacki; Burns, Alexander. 2019. “Which Democrats Are 
Leading the 2020 Presidential Race?”, The New York Times. December 20. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/elections/democratic-polls.html 
Exhibit 45: Marketing & CapEx 
scenarios 
Source: Analysts estimates 
 
Exhibit 46: U.S. Presidential elections 
scenarios 
Source: Analysts estimates 
 
A Republican defeat in the 
next presidential elections 
could lead to an increase in 
tax rate, negatively affecting 
US firms’ earnings. 
We believe CapEx will 
remain relatively constant in 
% of revenues and will not 
return to the significantly 
high values recorded up to 
2017. 
        
 








 Financial Statements 
Balance sheet 
In $m 
    
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 
Current Assets 
   
1,549 1,499 1,965 2,338 2,594 3,190 3,583 3,849 4,211 4,530 4,928 
Cash and cash 
equivalents 
  




280 434 623 610 653 635 746 723 833 814 915 
Inventories 
   
537 783 917 1,159 1,019 1,030 1,067 1,101 1,134 1,167 1,196 
Prepaid expenses and other 








306 539 804 886 827 814 846 885 929 977 1,027 
Operating leases right-of-use 
assets 
 
0 0 0 0 0 598 642 683 723 766 804 
Goodwill 
    
123 585 564 556 546 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Intangible assets, net 
  
26 76 64 47 42 38 35 32 30 29 27 
Deferred income taxes 
  
34 92 137 83 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Other long term assets 
  
57 76 110 97 124 110 118 125 133 141 148 
Total Assets       2,095 2,866 3,644 4,006 4,245 4,862 5,336 5,687 6,138 6,553 7,046 
                
                Liabilities and Stockholder's 
Equity 
            Current 
liabilities 
   
422 479 686 1,060 1,316 1,390 1,528 1,583 1,714 1,774 1,902 
Revolving credit facility, 
current 
 
0 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accounts payable 
  
210 200 410 561 561 543 616 613 685 683 755 
Accrued expenses 
  




0 0 0 0 301 307 330 351 372 393 413 
Current maturities of 
long term debt 
 








35 43 40 50 88 61 65 70 74 78 82 
Long term debt, net of current 
maturities 255 624 790 765 704 603 726 793 870 958 1,055 
Other long term 
liabilities 
  
68 95 137 162 208 156 167 178 188 199 209 
Operating lease liabilities, 
non-current 
 
0 0 0 0 0 586 628 668 708 749 787 
Total liabilities       745 1,198 1,613 1,988 2,228 2,735 3,049 3,222 3,480 3,681 3,953 
                
                Total Stockholder's 
























    
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 
Net 
revenues 
   




   
1,572 2,058 2,585 2,738 2,853 2,830 2,971 3,150 3,327 3,507 3,687 
Gross 
profit       1,512 1,906 2,249 2,251 2,340 2,467 2,712 2,895 3,076 3,271 3,430 
% Gross 
Margin 
   
49% 48% 47% 45% 45% 47% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 
Selling, general and 
administrative 





0 0 0 124 183 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Income (loss) 
from 












(6) (7) (3) (4) (9) (7) (8) (8) (9) (10) (10) 
Income (loss) 
before income 





134 154 131 38 (21) 48 71 78 85 94 97 
Income from 
equity method 
investment 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Net 
income 
(loss)       208 233 257 (48) (46) 110 161 178 194 215 221 
        
 








in $m 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F
Core Result 344$                383$                398$                96$                  162$                188$                267$                294$                321$                355$                368$                
Core Taxes 135$                153$                134$                71$                  39$                  56$                  80$                  88$                  96$                  106$                110$                
NOPLAT 210$                230$                264$                25$                  122$                132$                187$                206$                225$                248$                258$                
Depreciation 64$                  87$                  132$                166$                176$                193$                190$                197$                207$                217$                228$                
Amortization 9$                    14$                  13$                  8$                    6$                    6$                    5$                    5$                    5$                    4$                    4$                    
Operational Cash Flow 282$                331$                408$                199$                304$                331$                382$                408$                436$                469$                490$                
Invested Capital - Fixed Assets 306$                539$                804$                886$                827$                814$                846$                885$                929$                977$                1,027$             
Gross CAPEX 233$                266$                82$                  (59)$                 (13)$                 32$                  39$                  44$                  48$                  50$                  
Net CAPEX 320$                397$                247$                117$                180$                222$                236$                250$                265$                278$                
Invested Capital - NWC 786$                1,287$             1,450$             1,614$             1,631$             1,518$             1,623$             1,664$             1,762$             1,806$             1,890$             
Δ NWC 502$                163$                164$                17$                  (113)$               105$                41$                  98$                  44$                  84$                  
Δ Other Assets excl Intangibles 462$                (21)$                 (7)$                   (10)$                 53$                  44$                  41$                  41$                  43$                  39$                  
Δ Intangibles + Amortization 63$                  2$                    (9)$                   1$                    2$                    2$                    2$                    3$                    3$                    3$                    
Δ Other Liabilties 55$                  15$                  99$                  382$                (30)$                 52$                  48$                  48$                  50$                  45$                  
Investment Cash Flow (1,292)$            (526)$               (296)$               256$                (152)$               (322)$               (272)$               (344)$               (304)$               (359)$               
Free Cash Flow from Operations (961)$               (117)$               (97)$                 560$                179$                60$                  136$                92$                  165$                131$                
After tax non core result (17)$                 (29)$                 (7)$                   (16)$                 (134)$               (3)$                   (4)$                   (4)$                   (4)$                   (4)$                   (5)$                   
Change in long term liabilities 26$                  40$                  24$                  47$                  (53)$                 11$                  10$                  10$                  11$                  9$                    
Change in non operating assets 19$                  34$                  (14)$                 27$                  (15)$                 8$                    7$                    7$                    7$                    7$                    
Non-operating FCF (22)$                 (0)$                   22$                  (113)$               (42)$                 (0)$                   (0)$                   (1)$                   (1)$                   (2)$                   
FREE CASH FLOW (982)$               (118)$               (76)$                 447$                137$                59$                  136$                91$                  164$                129$                
Financial Result (2)$                   1$                    (7)$                   (43)$                 (36)$                 (19)$                 (23)$                 (25)$                 (27)$                 (30)$                 (33)$                 
Net Financial Assets 303$                (563)$               (575)$               (671)$               (215)$               (96)$                 (59)$                 51$                  115$                249$                346$                
Investments in NFA (865)$               (12)$                 (96)$                 457$                119$                37$                  111$                64$                  134$                96$                  
Net transactions with shareholders 116$                113$                22$                  45$                  -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 -$                 
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Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
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Abstract  
To perform a sensitivity analysis on the target price considering a valuation’s major inputs 
is crucial to understand and to prepare investors for all possible scenarios. Being so, I 
performed a sensitivity analysis on Under Armour’s target price considering a range of 
possibilities regarding UA’s number of house stores (brand and factory houses) in North 
America by 2023 and the focused performer’s annual spending in the wholesale channel 
with the brand.  
The target price is sensitive to these two inputs and would impact the recommendation on 
the main report. 
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About Under Armour 
Under Armour, Inc. is a sportswear company that develops, markets and distributes sports 
related performance products based in Maryland, the U.S. The company sells a broad range 
of apparel, footwear and accessories in North America, Europe, Middle East and Africa 
(EMEA), Asia-Pacific and Latin America. UA distributes its products through the wholesale, 
direct to consumer and licensing channels. Also, its Connected Fitness business line contains 
the MapMyFitness, MyFitnessPal and Endomondo apps, that have been growing at a fast 
pace over the last few years. 
SWOT Analysis 
Ended its three-year restructuring process caused by a sluggish North American business and 
inefficient inventory management, Under Armour is now going to follow a strategic growth 
plan aiming the period from 2020 to 2023. Being so, I believe it is crucial to perform a 
SWOT analysis to understand the company’s positioning in the market. 
Strengths: Under Armour’s main strength relies on having a positive yoy growth in total net 
revenues regardless the problems that the company is facing. Although the North American 
business is indeed getting weaker, Under Armour is being able to more than compensate it 
with its international expansion and presence, recording consecutive positive growth rates 
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regarding EMEA, Asia-Pacific and Latin America geographical segments. Last quarter (3Q 
2019), revenue was up 9% in EMEA, 4% in Asia-Pacific and down 4% in Latin America. 
Weaknesses: Under Armour had, in the last couple of years, an inventory growth higher than 
the net revenues growth, leading to an accumulation of unsold inventory and consequent 
decrease in the company’s gross margin (exhibit 1). Also, the UA’s inventory turnover is low 
when compared to its competitor’s, meaning that it takes longer for Under Armour to convert 
its inventory into net revenues. This can be also seen as an opportunity, since the company is 











Opportunities: the focused  performer and the international expansion must be seen as the 
main drivers for Under Armour to create value. These drivers were incorporated the 
valuation model whithin the forecasts of the wholesale and DTC retail channel, respectively.
Exhibit 1: Inventory growth vs. Net revenues growth (%)  
Source: Company data 
   
 








Threats: Under Armour’s main threat is related to the fact that the company is part of a very 
competitve and fragmented industry, in which operate two major companies: Nike and 
Adidas. Thus, it becomes difficult to gain market share to its competitors and to gain 
exposure when it comes to Under Amour’s marketing, brand image and consumer awareness 
worldwide.  
Strategies Overview 
Under Armour has been adapting to the market, to economic conditions and to consumer 
preferences by establishing and following strategies in order to overcome problems and to 
drive itself to the company’s ultimate goal: sustainable growth.  
The period between 2017 and 2019 was a period of restructuring, in which Under Armour’s 
strategy was to “Protect This House”. According to the company, UA had clear targets for 
what would be ultimate goal for each year: to get organized in 2017, to get to work in 2018 
and to execute in 2019. Under Armour listened to 22,000 consumers worldwide to 
strengthen its brand positioning by reinforcing its mission and vision, and to identify its 
target consumer. The company’s renewed consumer centric approach understands the 
consumer needs that vary according to specific contexts and creates performance solutions 
for each scenario that would ultimately fulfil Under Armour’s mission - to Make You Better. 
To comprehend that each consumer tells a different story and has different necessities 
alongside with a disciplined operating model and an overhaul of UA’s go-to-market process, 
is indeed restructuring the company, preparing it for a sustainable growth in a near future. In 
2019, UA intends to execute by driving operational efficiencies through new processes in 
order to reach three fundamental values: confidence, credibility and consistency. 
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The sportswear company intends to stabilize and right-size the inventory levels in order to increase 
its margins as well as continue to contract the wholesale as it focus on the expansion of the direct to 
consumer channel, both retail and digital. Under Armour wants to move from defense to offense to 
become once again a fast-growing firm within the sportswear industry. 
To “Perform With Balance” is Under Armour’s strategy for the period between 2020 and 2023. In 
this period, the company wants to focus on performance premium distribution as it reinforces its 
connection to the focused performer consumer, aiming continually at both the direct to consumer 
retail and digital channels as well as to the international business. As previously stated, the 
company believes that this is the way to deliver consistent financial performance and to become a 
major and important player of the sportswear industry once again. 
Building Scenarios 
Under Armour relies heavily on its North American business, being more exposed to its domestic 
drivers when compared to its international segment. As I believe the international business will not 
suffer a slowdown in the upcoming years, the North America’s business’ vulnerability can indeed 
be either a threat or an opportunity for the company. Being so, I decided to perform a sensitivity 
analysis based on the number of houses that UA intends to open by 2023 (235 as base case), that 
directly influence the company’s DTC retail sales. Note that, according to UA, factory house stores 
serve an important role in overall inventory management as the company sells a significant portion 
of excess through this channel, especially discontinued and out-of-season products. Through brand 
house stores, consumers can experience the full premium expression of the brand while having 
broader access to performance products. Also, knowing that the focused performer is Under 
Armour’s main driver for the future, I included the annual spending of this type of consumer in 
North America for UA’s wholesale channel in this sensitivity analysis ($389 as base case).   
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Exhibit 2: Sensitivity Analysis 
 

















24 231 233 235 237 239 
359 19.51 24.21 31.59 44.85 75.67 
369 18.57 22.53 28.40 38.03 56.75 
379 17.78 21.17 25.99 33.38 46.18 
389 17.10 20.05 24.09 29.99 39.42 
399 16.51 19.10 22.56 27.41 34.70 
409 15.98 18.29 21.29 25.37 31.21 
419 15.51 17.58 20.22 23.70 28.52 
 
 
Given a current price of $21.85 as of 6-Jan-20, exhibit 2 contains different target prices regarding 
different scenarios and the correspondent recommendation: BUY – green fill, SELL – red fill, 
HOLD – yellow fill. Through this analysis I can conclude that Under Armour’s target price for 
December 2020 has a high level of sensitivity to both the company’s number of houses in North 
America by 2023 and to the focused performer spending in wholesale in 2020. The base case of the 
main report relies on 235 houses in North America by 2023 and $389 spending by the focused 
performer: a target price equal to $24.09, hence, a BUY recommendation.  
As it is observable in exhibit 2, for the same number of house stores, the more the focused 
performer spends on UA’s wholesale channel, the lower is the company’s target price. I believe this 
derives from the fact that the DTC retail channel (brand and factory house stores) has higher 
margins that the wholesale one (focused performer). Being so, as the wholesale business increases 
as % of total, the margins will tend to decrease and, consequently, the target price will be reduced 
as well. Through this analysis, I reached a maximum price of $75.67 (for 239 houses and a $359 
focused performer spending) and a minimum price equal to $15.51 (for 231 houses and a $359 
focused performer spending). 
Source: Analyst estimates 
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